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 Should We Compare 
Laws or Cultures?
HEIKE JUNG* 
1. Introduction
Comparatists have always known that a meaningful comparison cannot be confined to 
narrow positivistic exercises. They have learned to extend the focus to the institutional 
and systematic context.1 Moreover, they have become increasingly aware of the fact that, 
in order to grasp the gist of another legal system (‘what makes them tick’), one has to reach 
out for the socio-cultural characteristics. Some culturalists’ even claim: ‘la comparaison 
des droits sera CULTURELLE ou elle ne sera pas’.2 This pronounced statement raises seve-
ral related questions: 
1. How autonomous are the law and its administrators?
2. What do the terms ‘culture’ and ‘legal culture’ mean? 
*        Heike Jung is Professor Emeritus of Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure, Criminology and 
Comparative Criminal Law at the University of Saarland. - Updated and revised English version 
of my contribution ‘Rechtsvergleich oder Kulturvergleich?’ to the Festschrift für Frisch (Duncker 
& Humblot 2013) p. 1467.
1 Already Mittermaier, Die Lehre vom Beweise im deutschen Strafprozesse: nach der Fortbildung 
durch Gerichtsgebrauch und deutsche Gesetzbücher in Vergleichung mit den Ansichten des 
englischen und französischen Strafverfahrens (Heyer 1834) p. 42, refuted pointillistic loans from 
other systems and pleaded in favour of respecting the organic context:   ‘Es ist ein schwer zu 
tadelnder  Fehler vorzüglich neuerer Gesetzgeber, welche verleitet durch den Reiz der Neuheit und 
durch das Streben nach Originalität und von dem Wunsche beseelt, allen Partheien zu gefallen, 
gerne aus allen möglichen Legislationen einzelne Theile herausnehmen, nicht beachtend, dass 
diese Theile in der Gesetzgebung, welcher sie angehören, in einem organischen Zusammenhang 
mit andern Einrichtungen stehen, von denen sie nicht losgerissen werden dürfen, wenn nicht ein 
Gebäude ohne alle Harmonie entstehen soll’.
2 Legrand, Le droit comparé, 5th ed. (Presses Universitaires de France 2015) p. 123 (‘The comparison 
of legal systems needs to be CULTURAL, otherwise it is no comparison at all’).
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3. Is a comparison of legal culture feasible and, if at all, by which means and methods?
4. What is the aim of such a demanding enterprise? Explaining the differences or foster 
harmonization?
These questions come close to a questionnaire of what comparative method and compar-
ative law is about. In actual fact, we reach out for no less than the role of law in society. 
If law is essentially an autonomous entity, though to some extent tainted by specificities 
of the particular society, its administrators, i.e. the lawyers, will be able to cope with any 
positivistic content. Hence, legal transplants and harmonization appear to be manageable 
projects. If law is primarily conceived of as a product of a particular culture, harmoni-
zation moves will be heading for deep waters and comparison will be mainly restricted 
to explaining the differences. Since globalization and international cooperation call for 
a certain harmonization of legal systems, ‘culturalists’ tend to hinder the comparative 
agenda. According to them, any large scale harmonization will rather amount to an im-
possible mission.
This controversy has triggered a vivid debate among comparatists about the role of 
culture.3 One thing goes for sure: cultural aspects cannot be discarded in the comparative 
enterprise. Yet, there is no general answer as to their concrete impact on research projects 
in comparative law. It may well be that with some (more technical) issues we need not 
bother at all, whereas others do need a cultural fine-tuning. In a way, this exercise is fas-
cinating and cumbersome at the same time, fascinating because we are heading for an in-
tellectual adventure, cumbersome because the wide concept of law meets the even wider 
concept of culture. Therefore some lawyers even try to avoid the culture debate altogether 
assuming that the reference to culture is a cover-up for methodological sloppiness.4 Even 
some sociologists take a reluctant approach when it comes to using the term ‘culture’ in 
the context of law.5
So much difficulty calls for a reduction of complexity. This accounts in particular 
for the term ‘culture’. It fills libraries. Depending on the subject matter and the specific 
3 E.g. Cotterrell, Comparative Law and Legal Culture in The Oxford Handbook of Comparative 
Law, eds. Reimann and Zimmermann (Oxford University Press 2008) p. 209; Bell, De la culture 
in Comparer les droits, résolument, ed. Legrand (Presses Universitaires de France 2009) p. 247, 
Nelken, Rethinking Legal Culture in Law and Sociology, Current Legal Issues 2005, Vol. 8, ed. 
Freeman (Oxford University Press 2006) p. 200; Rosen, Law as Culture (Princeton University 
Press 2008).
4 Hörnle, Unterschiede zwischen Strafverfahrensordnungen und ihre kulturellen Hintergründe, 
117 Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafrechtswissenchaft (2005) p. 801 et seq. hints at this position.
5 Cf. Friedman, The Republic of Choice: Law, Authority, and Culture (Harvard University Press 
1990) p. 95: ‘”Legal culture” is a phrase conveniently used for norms and ideas about law, but it is 
an abstraction, and a slippery one’.
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national context, it may have differing connotations. Linking the term with law or with 
a particular legal system does not bring more clarity. Of course, ‘legal culture’ may pass 
as a cipher for the idiosyncrasies of a legal order or a legal style6 thus providing a rough 
orientation. But what do we mean by ‘cipher’ or by ‘idiosyncrasy’? Are we still moving 
in legal territory or have we already transgressed the borders and where to?  Where does 
culture turn into law and law into culture?
A ‘culturalist’ approach is akin to Montesquieu´s7 relativism. The relativity may vary 
according to the character of the particular project, its topic, its purpose and its dimen-
sion. Also, the increasing interaction on a global scale favours an increasing sensitivity 
for a certain universalism which competes with a growing respect for the diversity of 
legal traditions. Hence, the idea of harmonization, at least of some areas of law, cannot 
be rejected a limine. This statement is not meant to anticipate the outcome of this study. 
I just want to warn of a false antagonism.
2. The Interdisciplinary Background
The fact that law is impregnated by culture is no news. We recall older (German) contro-
versies about whether or not law is a ‘cultural science’ (Kulturwissenschaft)8 which dwell 
on the notion that law is a science after all. Still, the sense of comparatists for the cultural 
component of law was not as developed as one might think. Though Montesquieu, one 
of the founding fathers of comparative law,9 had paved the way for such considerations, it 
took two centuries until they really caught on in the community of comparatists. The duo 
of sociology and criminology has, despite some differences in the fine-tuning, sensitized 
comparatists to look beyond the positivistic façade of legal systems and to discover the 
societal mould of the normative material which made their analytical endeavour turn 
into a new direction. Again, already Montesquieu had alluded to the idea that law is 
an instrument of social control.10 But only a more developed sociology of law made us 
aware of the consequences, thus altering our understanding of criminal law and criminal 
6 Cf. Mankowski, Rechtskultur, 64 JuristenZeitung (2009) p. 321; and, more recently, Mankowski, 
Rechtskultur (Mohr Siebeck 2016) p. 2. In a way, the article in the JuristenZeitung preludes his 
impressive magnum opus.
7 For a general account of Montesquieu´s philosophy of law e. g. Goyard-Fabre, La philosophie du 
droit de Montesquieu (Kliencksieck 1979).
8 E.g. Senn and Puskaś (eds.), Rechtswissenschaft als Kulturwissenschaft?, Beiheft Nr. 115 Archiv 
für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie (Steiner 2008). 
9 On the role of Montesquieu as a comparatist cf. Constantinesco, Rechtsvergleichung, Vol. I 
(Heymanns 1971) p. 78.
10 Cf. Book VI, Chapter XII of his De l´esprit des lois (‘De la puissance des peines’).
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justice. Their functioning, institutional design and societal context are subject to a more 
conscious reflection today.
This does, however, not give a sufficient explanation, since sociology and criminology 
had already flourished before the relationship between law and culture has attracted our 
interest. Here, two related developments come into play: the ‘cultural turn’ initiated by 
semantics on the one hand,11 and anthropology, ethnology and ethnography on the other. 
They have, in a hitherto unknown sharpness, brought ‘context’ to the forefront. This term, 
despite or because of its vagueness, describes perhaps best what ‘law and culture’ is about. 
It is difficult to assess the impact of these different disciplines separately since they are 
linked with each other. I daresay that we have profited most from ethnology.12 The over-
spill into other disciplines has led to a refinement in the general methodological reper-
toire of the social sciences with repercussions on comparative law as well (see the role of 
participating observation13). Generally speaking, empiricists in the social sciences which 
used to believe in quantitative methods and ‘hard facts’ have increasingly turned towards 
qualitative approaches.14 Geertz has propagated the idea of ‘the meaningful detail’ with-
out giving us enough guidance as to how and where to look for it.15 Those comparatists 
who had, from the outset, made an effort to back their studies by field-work in order to 
get some idea of the ‘legal climate’ felt reassured. Yet, at the same time, research projects 
became more and more demanding.
The political changes and these scientific developments have gone hand in hand to 
promote a culture-oriented comparison. Globalisation has to some extent promoted a 
platform of common understanding, yet it has also catapulted local sites and develop-
ments into the limelight of a world-wide attention. It has sensitized for frictions and dif-
ferences. In that sense, it has rather been a booster for an ethnology which takes note of 
the tensions between the local and the global.16 Thus ‘cultural identity’ and ‘global trends’ 
are concomitant features in contemporary societies. This certain contradiction (or is it an 
amalgam?) between universalism and diversity is of major concern for those sociologists 
who try to explain a world which seems to bid farewell to societies.17 
11 E.g. Bachmann-Medick, Cultural Turns (Rowohlt 2006).
12 See in particular the classical studies by Gluckman, The Judicial Process among the Barotse of 
Northern Rhodesia (The Free Press 1955); Roberts, Order and Dispute: an Introduction to Legal 
Anthropology (Penguin Books 1979); for a general overview cf. Rosen 2008. 
13 On the role of participating observation in comparative law e.g. Jung, Über die Beobachtung als 
Methode der Strafrechtsvergleichung in In dubio pro libertate: Festschrift für Klaus Volk zum 65. 
Geburtstag, eds. Hassemer, Kempf and Moccia (Beck 2009) p. 223.
14 E.g. Kunz, Die wissenschaftliche Zugänglichkeit von Kriminalität (Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften 
2008). 
15 Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (Basic Books 1973) p. 23
16 Cf. Abélès, Anthropologie de la globalisation (Payot 2008). 
17 E. g. Touraine, La fin des sociétés (Seuil 2013) p. 496 et seq. 
Bergen Journal of Criminal Law and Criminal Justice • 1/2017
5
As a result, law has increasingly become a matter of ‘meta-legal’ scrutiny. This has fos-
tered a new perception of law which is no longer being conceived of as a business of mere 
interpretation of texts. Rather we are keen to reach out for the background. Moreover, 
we have learned that law consists of a sequence of institutional acts which forge social 
cohesion by offering a formalized frame for social interaction. Expanding the dictum that 
‘Justice must be seen to be done’18 we have also revisited the role of rituals in law building 
upon a solid body of interdisciplinary research on the matter.19 
It is self-evident that the culture paradigm has been adopted with different intensity 
on the academic scene. Whereas studies in ‘intercultural communication’ appear to be 
the natural extension of the traditional curriculum of the language department, a syl-
labus of business administration which covers culturally differing managerial styles is 
more noteworthy.20 Law departments proceed only reluctantly. Even comparatists have 
not been overly keen to embark on this venture for fear of the complexity of the task. 
Comparing different legal systems in a two hours course is difficult enough even on a 
positivistic basis. 
3. From Culture to Legal Culture
There is no easy way to define ‘culture’. The term lacks precision. It seems that again 
ethnologists can provide help since they were the first to use the term on a larger scale.21 
The concept seems to have originated from Germany. Its meaning is, to some extent, con-
text-bound.22 Ethnologists tend to associate mythology, philosophy, language, arts and 
customs with it, putting the emphasis on customs. In more general terms, we could speak 
of ‘life style’. At the same time, the term may, being related to ‘arts’, hint at a particular el-
evated life style, at something distinct from the ordinary: ‘Par culture on désignait ce qu´il 
y a de plus élevé et de précieux dans la société’.23 This certain refinement may be related to 
any area of life. If we speak of an eating culture we do not refer to the mere consumption 
of food, but rather to a specific eating habit, perhaps to characterize the French, Spanish, 
18 Lord Hewart in: R. v. Sussex Justices, ex parte McCarthy (1924) 1 KB 256, 259.
19 Deprez, Rituel judiciaire et procès pénal (L. G. D. J. 2009); Jung, Rituals and Procedure in Visions 
of Justice: Liber Amicorum Mirjan Damaska, eds. Ackerman, Ambos and Sikiric (Duncker & 
Humblot 2016) p. 259.    
20 Cf. Morschett, Schramm-Klein and Zentes, Strategic International Management, 3rd ed. (Gabler 
Springer 2015) p. 203 et seq.
21 E.g. for the following in particular Abélès 2008 p. 63 et seq.  
22 Cf. Greve, The Historical Roots – European Legal Cultural Traditions, (Juridiska Föreningen i 
Finland 2010) p. 482.
23 See Abélès 2008 p. 64 (‘The term culture hinted at something more elevated and precious in 
society’).
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Indian or Chinese cuisine. The term political culture insinuates a civilized political de-
bate.
This is, however, not implied when we associate a medium like language or law with 
culture. In this case, we focus on a particular social background which, with law, accounts 
for the special character of a legal system. Yet, even in connection with law, the use of 
the term ‘culture’ may also refer to a particular laudable practice. In Germany, Häberle 
has, for example, popularized the use of the term ‘Grundrechtskultur’24 which, somewhat 
related to the term ‘politische Kultur’ implies that public life is not just guided by the 
Grundrechte as a normative frame and limitation, but inspired by their philosophy as an 
overarching aspiration. It may well be that this positive connotation is a German lawyer´s 
import into the general usage of the term. The title of Garland´s study ‘The Culture of 
Control’25 rather reveals ‘sociological neutrality’. When we speak of the ‘American gun 
culture’ we can even sense a pejorative connotation.
Be that as it may: we have to cope with a certain vagueness which invites subjectivism. 
Speaking of ‘Rechtskultur’ we leave the more or less nicely circumscribed terrain of legal 
positivism and reach out for justice as an inspiration and regulative ideal which may well 
produce a variety of manifestations. In this general sense, law is culture.26 Or, genetically 
speaking: ‘the concept of law is itself a product of a specific culture’.27 
In general, cultural aspects will rather tend to pervade key issues, general characteris-
tics and modes of thinking.28 But often enough details – see Geertz – will also be imbued 
by culture. The search for the background melody of the system has to be accompanied 
by an institution- and actor-oriented approach and a look at the status of the law, i.e. the 
interdependence with the state and society, the tradition of conflict resolution etc. Mod-
ern terminology like ‘governance’ may be of help to get one´s bearings since it captures 
the general issue of power and regulation irrespective of any preconceived notion of state 
structure.
The religious background plays an increasingly important role. Though it is not easy, 
if not impossible, to disentangle religion from general political considerations,29 religion 
is increasingly – in the aftermath of Huntington´s famous article ‘The Clash of Civiliza-
tions?’30 - conceived of as a divide which triggers or boosts many a conflict in today´s 
24 Häberle, Grundrechtsgeltung und Grundrechtsinterpretation im Verfassungsstaat, 44 
JuristenZeitung (1989), pp. 913 and 915.
25 Garland, The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society (Oxford 
University Press 2001).
26 See Mankowski 2009 p. 322; idem 2016 p. 5.
27 Raz, On the Nature of Law, 82 Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie (1996) pp. 1 and 4.
28 E.g. Galtung, Struktur, Kultur und interkultureller Stil, 11 Leviathan (1983) p. 303.
29 For a general outlook on the issue e.g. Graf and Meier (eds.), Politik und Religion (Beck 2013).
30 Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, 72, Number 3, Foreign Affairs (1993) p. 22.
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world. The history of legal transplants has shown to which extent religious beliefs steer 
and modulate the approach to law and its positivistic emanations. Likewise, societies may 
be distinguished according to the impact of religion on public life.
In view of all this, we need a specialist for the general view, i.e. for bringing things 
together. Our search is hampered by the fact that those who are engaged in the matter do 
not necessarily agree on the premises of this undertaking. Whereas some focus on the 
general impact of culture on legal culture others try to delineate concrete indicators for 
a more meaningful comparison. Thus Friedman refers to ‘attitudes and values’31 whereas 
Blankenburg underlines the interplay between law and its institutions, legal action and 
the consciousness of law.32 Mankowski´s illuminating long and diversified list of aspects 
and perspectives for the sub-declination of our topic indicates that there is no consented 
systematic approach.33 We have to accept that researchers follow their personal prefer-
ences when it amounts to such a ‘Gesamtschau’.34 The French ‘Dictionnaire de la cul-
ture juridique’35 does not offer much guidance as to its understanding of legal culture; its 
modus operandi seems to be a learned eclecticism assuming that some ‘vue d´ensemble’ 
(overarching perspective) will emerge in the course of events.
4. On the Relevance of the ‘Culture-Factor’ in Comparison 
Though the relationship between law and culture is evident, it is not clear what that 
means for the comparative enterprise. Of course, everybody would probably subscribe to 
the appealing title of the reader edited by Legrand ‘Comparer les droits, résolument’.36 Yet, 
on second thought, this addendum to his provocative dictum ‘que la comparaison sera 
CULTURELLE ou ne sera pas’37 does not offer much additional guidance. Does it call for 
a deeper scrutiny, for more zeal or more dedication to the cause? In his introduction Leg-
rand offers an authentic interpretation in that he pleads against positivism and in favour 
31 Friedman, Blankenburg on Legal Culture: Some Comments in Soziologie des Rechts: Festschrift 
fur Erhard Blankenburg zum 60. Geburtstag, eds. Brandt and Strempel (Nomos 1998) pp. 381 and 
383. 
32 Blankenburg, Indikatorenvergleich der Rechtskulturen in der Bundesrepublik und den 
Niederlanden, 6 Zeitschrift für Rechtssoziologie (1985), pp. 255 and 257 et seq.
33 Mankowski 2009. The outline of his book (note 6) will be a source of inspiration for further 
systematisation. Yet, I agree with Mankowski that we should not overdo it since life is colourful 
and reality is disparate: Mankowski 2016 p. 504.
34 Bell 2009 p. 278 also favours this term (‘vue d´ensemble du système juridique’).
35 Alland and Rials (eds.), Dictionnaire de la culture juridique (Presses Universitaires de France 
2003). Much more convincing in this respect Nuotio, Melander and Huomo-Kettunen (eds.), 
Introduction into Finnish Law and Legal Culture (Forum Iuris 2012).
36 See Legrand 2009.
37 See Legrand 2015.
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of ‘l´alterite’.38  Though this introduction reveals a profound thinker with a poetic touch 
it remains somewhat vague as to the concrete guidance. 
Generally speaking, a culture-oriented comparison calls for an increased sensitivity 
for context. This methodological requirement is, as such, not contested among compar-
ative lawyers.39 Still, Legrand´s dictum identifies and separates different camps of com-
paratists. It is, so to speak, the password to enter the congregation of culture-oriented 
comparatists. I would like to question the inherent exclusionary touch of Legrand´s state-
ment, since, in its rigidity, it may discourage from engaging in comparative law. It should 
certainly not dissuade us from concrete comparative projects, nor should it be read as an 
invitation to disregard the positive law. Comparison is above all guided by the maxim 
‘learning by doing’. Even beginners will soon have learned to double-check their positivis-
tic project by context-oriented considerations. What may have looked like a detour in the 
beginning may, in the course of the undertaking, turn out to be the direttissima.  In that 
sense, we might want to take Legrand´s statement as a reminder that curiosity is perhaps 
the primary virtue of a good comparatist.
Over time, our young researcher will realise that legal systems have particular trade-
marks, a unique set of primary normative aspirations which proliferate the whole system 
and which dictate the knitting pattern of different legal issues. For the U. S. A., freedom 
of speech, the prohibition of racial discrimination and federalism40 form a triad which 
has been shaped early in American history and which, today, constitutes the recurrent 
knitting pattern for the settlement of major conflicts. Other legal systems will subscribe 
to a similar or a different set of basic premises which we should always take into account 
when called upon to give advice on a specific issue. 
Difference will also turn up on the level of principles. Subscribing to the same prin-
ciple does not mean that the practice looks alike. The understanding and the application 
of the principle in the daily practice may differ due to countervailing tendencies. Thus, 
France was upset when Dominique Strauss-Kahn was presented in handcuffs in front of 
the assembled media which would have constituted a criminal offence in France.41 In the 
U. S. A., the ‘perpetrators walk’ constitutes an almost uncontested normality though the 
prosecution authorities in both countries are bound by the same (really?) presumption 
38 Legrand, Au lieu de soi, in: Legrand 2009 p. 11; also idem Legrand 2015 p. 49 et seq.
39 For an overview on the methods of comparative law cf. Eser, Strafrechtsvergleichung: Entwicklung 
– Ziele – Methoden in Strukturvergleich strafrechtlicher Verantwortlichkeit und Sanktionierung 
in Europa, eds. Eser and Perron (Duncker & Humblot 2015) p. 929. Eser refers to the ‘culture 
question’ in several passages of this magnum opus, without, however, devoting a chapter of its 
own to it. 
40 E.g. Breyer, Active Liberty (Vintage Books 2006) pp. 39 (Speech), 56 (Federalism) and 75 
(Affirmative Action).
41 Cf. Le Monde, 21 May 2011, p. 4.
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of innocence.42 Evidently, the image of the sheriff´s successful fight against the ‘crooks’ 
allows for a rougher approach as to what a suspect has to endure. This goes to show that 
law is not a product of bureaucracy. The structural premises of law dwell on dispositions 
and habits of the particular society which have emerged through a longer process and 
will continue to do so following Hans Meyer´s dictum that the legislator does not make 
the law but that he just makes the law bind.43
5. Illustrandi Causa 
Due to the diffusiveness of the term ‘culture’ it would certainly be of help if we could 
become a bit more explicit. Geertz has sensitized us for the meaningful detail. I have 
rather emphasized the idea of the background melody. These positions need not be in 
contradiction with each other. The ‘perpetrators walk’ is an example which combines both 
aspects. Other striking examples may relate to the category of symbols and rituals which 
tend to incarnate the background melody of a legal system.44 Admittedly, my attempt to 
overcome mere theorizing will still remain in the abstract, ‘heavy stuff ’, since I will draw 
my examples from basic concepts. 
(1) I start this albeit brief rehearsal with the notion of law. Of course, I do not intend 
to embark on a general discourse on law. I shall restrict myself to a few comments on 
the relevance of law for a particular society.  This relevance is determined by the control 
potential and by the institutional set-up. We tend to rely on ‘a formal definition of the le-
gal’45 and on the existence of an executive machinery, normally attached to the state. This 
understanding of law or better the belief in the (dominant) role of law is, however, by no 
means universal. 
To begin with, some lawyers needed to be told by sociologists that law is not the 
only system of social control, but that it co-exists with other systems of norms. Legal 
42 For a thorough comparative overview e.g. Stuckenberg, Untersuchungen zur Unschuldsvermutung 
(de Gruyter 1998).
43 Meyer, Stellung und Aufgaben des Bundesministeriums der Justiz nach dem Auftrag des 
Grundgesetzes in Vom Reichsjustizamt zum Bundesministerium der Justiz, ed. Bundesministerium 
der Justiz (Bundesanzeiger Verlag 1977) pp. 443 and 455.
44 As to the legitimizing role of the ceremonial in the English legal system cf. Bourdieu, Sur 
l´État, Raison d´agir (Seuil 2012) p. 48. Kunz, Die Kulturgebundenheit des Strafrechts und 
seine Übertragbarkeit in fremde Rechtskreise in Strafrechtsvergleichung als Kulturvergleich, 
eds. Streng and Kett-Straub (Mohr Siebeck 2012) pp. 145 and 148, has emphasized the culture-
specific aspects of the presentation of law.
45 Glenn, Comparative Legal Families and Comparative Legal Traditions in The Oxford Handbook 
of Comparative Law, eds. Reimann and Zimmermann (Oxford University Press 2008) pp. 421 
and 428.
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philosophers like Neil MacCormick have seconded this motion.46 In his book The End of 
Law?47 O´Hagan has even addressed the question whether law and the state are not just 
withering away. Though abolitionist tendencies, fueled by communitarian approaches, 
seem to belong to a distant past, the idea of a normative pluralism is still on the agenda 
in particular in respect of the international normative interaction imposed by the inter-
nationalization of law. Also, distinct differences as to the relationship between law and 
democracy account for the ranking of law in different societies. For example, France has, 
in the past, in the footsteps of Rousseau and Jacobinism, favoured an alliance between la 
volonté générale and an administration entrusted with its execution. In consequence, the 
Rechtsstaat (Etat de droit) is a latecomer on the French scene.48 At present, we can detect 
tendencies to downplay the importance of law in Poland by curtailing the powers of the 
Courts;49 this seems to be a distant echo of Rousseau. The modern substantive German 
Rechtsstaats-concept is a product of the deep downfall during the Nazi-period. Yet, Ger-
mans have always cherished a special relationship to the law well documented in Kleist´s 
tale ‘Michael Kohlhaas’.50 Noll has, in comparing Germany and Switzerland, coined the 
provocative formula that in Germany democracy is deficient, whereas in Switzerland this 
holds true for the Rechtsstaat.51 My own extrapolation of a statement by Habermas52 that 
law is the language of democracy may indeed not meet general approval. 
As compared to Far Eastern countries, these inner-European differences appear to be 
niceties. Far Eastern societies seem to take a totally different approach to law or to the 
idea of a legal system.53 Granet´s assessment of what constitutes the Chinese everyday 
morality is as follows: neither God nor the law.54 We could also bring it onto the formula: 
‘Confucianism and the emperor’. Rouland even contends: ‘L´histoire du droit en Chine 
46 E.g. MacCormick, Institutions of Law (Oxford University Press 2008) pp. 285-289.
47 O´Hagan, The End of Law? (Basil Blackwell 1984).
48 Cf. Kimmel, Von der Jakobinischen Republik zur rechtsstaatlichen Demokratie in Frankreich 
Jahrbuch 2001, eds. Albertin et al. (Leske & Budrich 2001) p. 51.
49 E.g. Süddeutsche Zeitung, 14 July 2016, p. 6; Süddeutsche Zeitung, 22 Februry 2017, p. 9; 
Süddeutsche Zeitung, 18 July 2017, p. 6; Süddeutsche Zeitung, 19 July 2017, p. 6.
50 Cf. Jung, Michael Kohlhaas or the Germans and Their Law, Oñati Legal Series (online), 4 (6), 
1124-1132 <http ://ssrn.com/abstract=2523819> [Last checked on 18 July 2017].
51 Noll, Ist die Schweiz ein Rechtsstaat? in Gedanken über Unruhe und Ordnung, ed. Noll (Pendo 
1985) pp. 234 and 237.
52 Habermas, Über den inneren Zusammenhang von Rechtsstaat und Demokratie in Die 
Einbeziehung des Anderen, ed. Habermas (Suhrkamp 1996) pp. 293 and 301 (‘Die demokratische 
Idee der Selbstgesetzgebung muß sich im Medium des Rechts selbst Geltung verschaffen’). 
53 As a matter of fact, Glenn 2008 p. 435 contends: ‘Western legal traditions are the only ones which 
have developed the concept of a legal system’.
54 Granet, Das chinesische Denken, 5th ed. (Suhrkamp 1997) p. 318.
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est largement celle de son absence’.55 Though this may be an exaggeration it is a fact that 
there has been little theorizing about law in China. Law was primarily conceived of as an 
instrument of power.56 This explains the pre-dominance of criminal law. Furthermore, 
Hilgendorf alludes to the missing separation of Law and morality and to the dominance 
of the concept of duty in Confucianism.57 The family and the group are the central poles 
of reference and allegiance. This holds true for Japan as well.58 Here rules and law do not 
play such a decisive role in the maintenance of public order. At least, in actual practice, 
the mechanisms of informal social control, fueled by social hierarchy and the desire to 
maintain social harmony, still carry a substantial part of the ‘control load’. We need to be 
careful not to overstate this point. Ida for example insists on the emancipatory role of law 
and rebukes a ‘cultural determinism’. He believes that the reference to culture could serve 
as a strategy of immunization against progress.59 This is, of course, a voice from inside 
Japan, yet, a voice of a legal scholar who may vest more hope into the law than the public 
at large. Still, our stereotype statements on the Far Eastern disregard for the law may be 
open to reinterpretation.60
The juxtaposition ‘group vs. individual’ permeates the African debate as well. Conse-
quently, the African Charter on Human and Peoples´ Rights does not only provide rights, 
but duties as well. Law is rather considered to be a European export article, a product of 
colonisation. Mbaye has captured this distance towards law in the formula: ‘Généralement 
en Afrique, selon les mœurs et coutumes traditionnelles, se tenir loin du prétoire, n´avoir 
jamais à plaider tant comme demandeur que comme défendeur est un signe de sagesse et 
une raison d´être fier de sa moralité et de son comportement social’. 61 The administration 
55 Rouland, Introduction historique du droit (Presses Universitaires de France 1998) p. 41. (‘The 
history of law in China is largely that of its absence’).
56 MacCormack, Law and Punishment: the Western and the Traditional Chinese Legal Mind in 
The Legal Mind. Essays for Tony Honoré, eds. MacCormick and Birks (Oxford University Press 
1986) pp. 235 and 251.
57 Hilgendorf, Das chinesische Strafrechtssystem im sozio-kulturellen Kontext in  Ostasiatisches 
Strafrecht, ed. Hilgendorf (Mohr Siebeck 2010) p. 114 et seq. Illuminating on the relevance of 
Confucian thought also Chapter 9 ‘A Confucian Legal Tradition: Make it New (with Marx?)’ in 
Glenn, Legal Traditions of the World, 4th ed. (Oxford University Press 2010) p. 319.
58 Rohlen, Japanische Ordnungsprinzipien: Bindung, Autorität und Routine in  Anleitung zur 
Neugier. Grundlagen japanischer Erziehung, ed. Elschenbroich (Suhrkamp 1996) pp. 92 and 102.
59 Ida, Strafrechtsvergleich als Kulturvergleich? in Streng and Kett-Straub 2012 pp. 23 and 26.
60 See, concerning Japan, Rosen 2008 p. 95 et seq.
61 Mbaye, Les Droits de l´Homme en Afrique, 2nd ed. (Pedone 2002) p. 72. (‘Generally speaking, it is, 
according to  the traditional African custom, a sign of wisdom  and a reason to be proud of one´s 
morality and social behaviour to keep far off the court-room and to never have to plead a case either 
as plaintiff or as a defendant’). 
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of justice will in many African countries be confronted with the challenge to reconcile 
tradition and modernity.62
Of course, this distant approach to law is, outside the world of lawyers, a common 
phenomenon. In that sense, the divide between those who administer the law and those 
who are being administered63 imposes itself on our topic. Also, we have to concede that 
there are universal matter-of-fact developments which will leave their mark all over the 
world. However, if Nottage downplays the cultural component in his discourse on Japan, 
dwelling on the example of product liability,64 he cannot really dismantle the power of 
traditional concepts of conflict resolution. He only demonstrates that their relevance dif-
fers from problem to problem and from ‘Lebenswelt’ to ‘Lebenswelt’. Or, in more general 
terms, the cultural impact is of lesser importance with regulatory norms as compared to 
morally sensitive areas.65
 (2) The next candidate is the notion of punishment. Of course, punishment is a well-
known category in any legal system. This does, however, not mean that punishment is an 
uncontested concept. There are divergent positions as to the essence of punishment, as 
to the forms of punishment and as to the use of punishment. The German dichotomies 
‘punishment versus measure’ on the one hand and ‘punishment versus administrative 
fine’ on the other stand for a certain sophistication of the system of penal sanctions which 
is not altogether common. Not surprisingly, Delmas-Marty has used the term ‘matière 
pénale’ of Art. 6 ECHR to illustrate the fuzziness of law (‘le flou du droit’) and the role of 
fuzzy logics in legal thought.66 All this would, however, rather pass as a ‘technicality’, as a 
treat for lawyers.  
Garland has, from a criminological point of view, reached beyond that and adopted 
‘culture’ as the central theme not only in his trilogy Punishment and Modern Society,67 
62 Kamto, Une justice entre tradition et modernité, Nr. 156 (spécial) Afrique contemporaine (1990) 
p. 57.
63 This formula has been coined by Bankowski and Mungham, Laypeople and Lawpeople and the 
Administration of the Lower Courts, 9 International Journal of the Sociology of Law (1981) pp. 
85 and 99.
64 Nottage, The Still-Birth and Re-birth of Product Liability in Japan in Adapting Legal Cultures, 
eds. Nelken and Feest (Hart 2001) p. 147.
65 Cf. Kunz 2012. 
66 For the first time in Delmas-Marty, Le flou du droit (Presses Universitaires de France 1986) p. 
317.
67 Garland, Punishment and Modern Society (Oxford University Press 1991).
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The Culture of Control68 and Peculiar Institution,69 but also in many of his articles.70 He 
starts out by theorizing about penal sensibilities, the expressive use of punishment, and 
a rising punitiveness to end up with the role of the death penalty in the U. S. A. This ‘pe-
culiar institution’ seems to be the example for the cultural background of punitiveness.71 
Whereas, in the European Union, the prohibition of the death penalty belongs to the ac-
quis communautaire, it is still being practiced in many countries. In countries like China 
and the U. S. A., the traditional or pseudo-religious background for the retention of the 
death penalty is obvious. Likewise, the practice of corporal punishment in some Islamic 
states is being propagated as a symbol of adhesion to the true faith.72 For others, it raises 
questions as to the level of civilization of such a religious creed. Finally, the severity of 
sentences, the rate of prisoners73 and the prison regime74 may also pass as a test for the 
degree of civilization of that particular society.
Despite the cultural embeddedness of punishment, comparing systems of sanctions 
has a long history. As a matter of fact, the system of sanctions has acted as a catalyzer 
for the development of schemes for the protection of human rights with their inherent 
harmonization effect.75 Also, major currents in criminal policy will rarely be limited to a 
single country. Rather, criminal policy has always been an object of a busy import/export 
‘trade’. This holds true in particular for the list of non-custodial sanctions which have 
emerged over times, starting with probation and ending with community service, com-
pensation and electronic monitoring. The manifold international fora offer a platform 
for exchange in criminal policy matters, thus promoting a diffusion of ideas and models. 
Of course, we are far from uniformity. Yet, those who want to depart from the main-
stream feel obliged to justify their decision. At present, a great deal of this interaction 
takes place in the field of sanctioning. Here, the popular punitiveness in the U. S. A. has 
68 Garland, The Culture of Control (Oxford University Press 2001).
69 Garland, Peculiar Institution (Oxford University Press 2010).
70 Garland, A culturalist theory of punishment ?, 11 Punishment & Society (2009) p. 259; Garland, 
Concepts of Culture in the Sociology of Punishment in Travels of the Criminal Question, eds. 
Melossi, Sozzo and Sparks (Hart 2011) p. 17.
71 Garland 2010 attributes this retentionist approach to the death penalty in the U.S.A. mainly to 
‘local democracy’. In my opinion this aspect is only of a secondary nature. 
72 Illuminating as to a certain approximation of Islamic and secular principles in criminal law, 
Bohlander and Hedayati-Kakhki, Criminal Justice under Shari´ah in the 21st century – An Inter-
Cultural View, 23 Arab Law Quarterly (2009) p. 417.
73 It is a matter of controversy whether the rate of prisoners can be a yard-stick for the punitiveness 
of a society cf. Jung, Sanktionensysteme und Menschenrechte (Haupt 1992) p. 48 vs.  Pease, Cross-
National Imprisonment Rates, 34 British Journal of Criminology (1994) p. 116. 
74 E.g. Winston Churchill´s famous dictum in the House of Commons on July 20, 1910: ‘The moral 
temper of the public in regard to the treatment of crime and criminals is one of the most unfailing 
tests of the civilisation of  any country’. (Hansard XIX Col. 1354).
75 For a general account e.g. Jung 1992.
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mobilized resistance in Europe.76 Apparently, Greve believes in (more) cultural diversifi-
cation as a barrier against the oppressive crime control wave.77 I rather trust in the stan-
dard-setting function of international institutions like the European Court of Human 
Rights, the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT), the Council of 
Europe´s Recommendations and the many Conventions sponsored by this institution. I 
am, in this respect, putting the emphasis on the activities of the Council of Europe, be-
cause its instruments are, by and large, more cogent than the comparable instruments of 
the United Nations. Guided by an evaluative comparative law and overarching principles, 
they have, time and again, been able to curtail culture-oriented offsprings of domestic 
systems of sanctions. However, due to the majestic vagueness of human rights and the 
margin of appreciation of the member states78 the potential for harmonization is limited. 
(3) Procedures enjoy a particular longevity. Do they therefore qualify as a telling ex-
ample for the relationship between law and culture? We like to refer to the ‘sporting 
theory of justice’ used to qualify the Anglo-American type of criminal procedure79 as the 
unfailing proof of the connection between law and culture. ‘Fairness’, its offspring, has 
conquered the world, not only that of procedure.80 It might well be, however, that this 
terminology does not point to a genetic link, but that we are just explaining a particular 
structure by using pictures that everybody is familiar with. Still, the reference to sports, 
and thus to competition, is not without significance since it hints at the relationship be-
tween state structure and procedure. Procedures reveal different approaches to conflicts 
and their settlement and to the institutions entrusted with this business.81
Parading the different institutions may best show the amalgam between ‘law and cul-
ture’ in conflict resolution. We keep being fascinated by the institution of the jury, this 
small democratic panel which stands pars pro toto for the Anglo-American trial though, 
in practice, it plays, quantitatively speaking, a minor role. Due to the long tradition which 
goes back to the Magna Charta82 the jury trial is more than just a legal institution. It has 
76 See my own contribution Wider die neue Straflust!, 153 Goltdammer´s Archiv für Strafrecht 
(2006) p. 724
77 Greve 2010 p. 491 et seq.
78 On the margin of appreciation cf. Jung, Upgrade für die margin of appreciation? in 
Herausforderungen an Staat und Verfassung. Völkerrecht – Europarecht – Menschenrechte. Liber 
Amicorum für Torsten Stein, ed. Calliess (Nomos 2015) p. 976.
79 Herrmann, Die Reform der Hauptverhandlung nach dem Vorbild des anglo-amerikanischen 
Verfahrens (Röhrscheid 1971) p. 153.
80 Cf. Jung, Der Grundsatz des fair trial in rechtsvergleichender Sicht in Verfahrensrecht am 
Ausgang des 20. Jahrhunderts. Festschrift für Gerhard Lüke, eds. Prütting and Rüßmann (Beck 
1997) p. 323.
81 Still unsurpassed Damaška, The Faces of Justice and State Authority (Yale University Press 
1986). Cf. also Hörnle, Unterschiede zwischen Strafverfahrensordnungen und ihre kulturellen 
Hintergünde, 117 Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafrechtswssenschaft (2005) p. 801.
82 E.g. Lord Devlin, Trial by Jury, Revised Edition (Stevens 1966) p. 3 et seq. 
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become part of everyday life, of the cultural setting. This has, in recent times, been boost-
ed by the many trial films, starting with ‘Twelve Angry Men’, which have popularized the 
jury trial as the prototype of courtroom justice. This close attachment to the jury may ex-
plain why this institution ranks on top of the U. S. American list of ‘export-desiderata’ in 
judicial matters and why U. S. American lawyers have a tendency to confound lay justice 
with the jury question, thus marginalizing the many models of mixed tribunals which 
exist throughout the world.83
As a matter of fact, our understanding of procedures seems to be determined by their 
‘showpieces’. Whereas the jury symbolizes the Anglo-American procedure, the instruct-
ing judge is the ‘showpiece’ of the French criminal procedure.84 Instructing judges are 
surrounded by a similar myth, also cultivated by fiction and film. In particular in politi-
cally sensitive cases, the instructing judge represents the lonely rider against the political 
establishment. In a way, jury and instructing judge resemble each other: they are both, 
quantitatively speaking on the retreat. Yet, they are still both indicative of the basic fea-
ture of the particular procedure inasmuch as they mark its factually decisive phase, here 
the court-room, there the bureaux during the preliminary phase of the process.
In actual fact, the prosecutor has been a much more successful French export article, 
even with regard to the terminology, since it combines executive influence with the idea 
of the division of power in criminal justice, an emanation of the strong state with, how-
ever, in-built restraints. Of course, prosecutors are not alike. Much depends on the struc-
ture of the state: France, for instance, is a central state, whereas Germany is a federal state. 
In many countries, prosecutors are guided by the principle of discretion, in others by the 
principle of compulsory prosecution or a mix of compulsory prosecution and discretion. 
Their link with the executive, hence their independence, varies, the Italian prosecutor 
being, due to his inamovabilità, the most independent of them. Therefore prosecutors are 
not identical figures, but rather brothers or sisters.85
Generally speaking, the structure of the judiciary, the role of judges and the extent of 
lay participation in adjudication may vary considerably from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 
This is very much related to the cultural bias in favour or against professionalism in ad-
judication.86
83 E.g. Jung, In Defence of Lay Participation in Festschrift für Hans-Heiner Kühne zum 70. 
Geburtstag, eds. Esser et al. (Müller 2013) p. 251.
84 For the history of the instructing judge  cf. Clère and Farcy (eds.), Le juge d´instruction. Approches 
historiques (Editions Universitaires de Dijon 2010).
85 E.g. Jung, Le ministère public: portrait d´une institution, 15 Archives de politique criminelle 
(1993), p. 15; Lazerges (ed.), Figures du parquet (Presses Universitaires de France 2006).
86 Cf. Mankowski 2009 p. 326; idem, 2016 p. 306; Jung, Richterbilder. Ein interkultureller Vergleich, 
(Nomos 2006).
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Moreover, the institution of the jury has already alluded to the fact that conflict res-
olution cannot be conceived of as legal exercise (only). By way of ‘jury nullification’ ju-
ries have always brought to bear considerations which have reached beyond the law.87 In 
particular smaller societies have cherished the idea that (real) conflict resolution is about 
mending broken social relations by bringing the parties on speaking terms again.88 This 
requires a compromise culture and the respect for the individuality of each case. Such 
models are not at ease, to say the least, in a ‘society of strangers’ (Nader) even though the 
mediation movement shows that it is not a lost cause. 
6. Concluding Remarks
I have, on purpose, avoided the term ‘conclusion’. Our topic does not allow a clear-cut 
conclusion. At best, we might end up with a somewhat better, but still vague notion of 
what ‘law and culture’ is about. Also, this notion is tainted by subjectivism. This is my 
view, the view of a German criminal lawyer! 
To begin with, a German lawyer will approach the topic with a particular background. 
In that sense, comparative law perspectives tend to be somewhat personal. Since com-
paring resembles traveling it is very much a personal experience.89 In addition to that 
the culture-discourse is tainted by national predispositions and stereotypes: The German 
‘Kampf ums Recht’90 might strike the French lawyer as totally inelegant. 
Moreover, criminal law is a branch of law which is very much imbued with culture. 
Private lawyers may arrive at slightly different conclusions. 
Still almost everybody will agree that culture introduces an element of relativity. The 
relativity will vary, depending on the nature of the problem. Therefore the simple answer 
to our question is: we have to compare laws, but we should not disentangle them from 
their cultural background. This calls for a more open culture-sensitive approach to com-
parison. Yet, normally, a true interest in foreign laws should go hand in hand with an 
interest in other cultures.
87 See Jung, Die Jury und ihr Entscheidungsgegenstand – zur „Jury Nullification“ in Prozessuales 
Denken als Innovationsanreiz für das materielle Strafrecht, eds. Pieth and Seelmann (Helbing & 
Lichtenhain 2006) p. 43.
88 E. g. Rosen, The Anthropology of Justice (Cambridge University Press 1989) pp. 17 and 37 with 
reference to the kadi-system.
89 Cf. the very personal account by Tunc, Les joies et les peines d´un comparatiste in 
Entwicklungslinien in Recht und Wirtschaft, eds. Jung, Kroeber-Riel and Wadle (Schäffer 1990) 
p. 123.
90 Cf. von Ihering, Der Kampf ums Recht (Trapeza 2012) (Reprint of the original of 1894).
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Rather than using the term culture, Glenn, in his magnum opus, speaks of legal tradi-
tion. Certainly culture has a strong affinity to tradition. Yet, I prefer to speak of legal ‘cul-
ture’ because of the ‘fluidity’ of this term. Also ‘tradition’ tends to over-emphasize law and 
its administrators. The term culture invites to a stocktaking of a more general nature. This 
should embrace the social, religious and ideological characteristics of a society in order 
to understand that legal orders are the normative aspirations of a particular society with 
its particular life style and priorities. Not surprisingly, these characteristics are brought 
to bear in rituals and symbols offering ‘social abbreviations’ which help promoting social 
stability and cohesiveness. In that sense, even more cross-cultural research on (legal) 
rituals is needed.
The human rights discourse provides some common ground, even alluding to the 
emergence of a common, though still fragile, legal culture.91 Of course, the universality of 
Human Rights is still a contested issue due to rivaling Human Rights systems.92 Recon-
ciling cultural diversity with the idea of universal Human Rights is indeed a permanent 
challenge.93 Yet, this discourse offers at least a vision. It hints at a deeply rooted notion if 
not of justice but of limits.94 
Law, and this goes for sure, is not a mere technique. It is also a cultural phenomenon. 
Of course, comparative lawyers need not be experts in ‘cultural studies’. Yet, they should 
be prepared to reach out beyond the law books and court-reports and to invest more in 
field work and interdisciplinary discourse in order to arrive at a more profound knowl-
edge of ‘the other’.95  
91 Tuori, Critical Legal Positivism (Ashgate 2002) p. 196 assumes a pre-existing common ground 
as part of his concept of a ‘multilayered legal order’: ‘When we, in our archeological journey into 
the law penetrate deeper we can detect common features crossing cultural differences, such as 
fundamental human rights principles’.
92 Cf. Trechsel, Inflation im Bereich der Menschenrechte?, 1 Zeitschrift für Europarechtliche Studien 
(1998) p. 371.
93 On this issue e.g. Kassedjian, Le droit international collaboratif (Pedone 2016), p. 74 et seq.
94 Toying with Camus´ statement: ‘Es gibt keine Gerechtigkeit, es gibt nur Grenzen’. (Tagebücher 
1935-1951), (Rowohlt 1997) p. 389.
95 Into the same direction the remarkable plea for a culture-oriented comparative criminal law by 
Beck, Strafrecht im interkulturellen Dialog in Strafrechtsvergleichung als Problem und Lösung, 
eds. Beck, Burchard and Fateh-Moghadam (Nomos 2011) p. 65 et seq.
